




UNHSC

United Nations Historical Security Council



Agenda:
Deliberating on the Power
Struggle and Rising
Intervention in Cold War
Latin America (1954-1974).



U.S. IMPOSES ARMS BLOCKADE ON CUBA
ON FINDING OFFENSIVE-MISSILE SITES;
KENNEDY READY FOR SOVIET SHOWDOWN

S. JUDGES GIVEN
POWER TO REQUIRE
LIFE FOR NEGROES

Chinese Open New Front;
Use Tanks Against Indians

Ships Must Stop
If Big Rockets Are
Not Disarmed



PRESIDENT GRAVES
Asserts Russians Lied
and Put Hemisphere
in Great Danger

TRAFFIC DELAYED
AT BERLIN BORDER

Mao Says U.S. Holds
Red Fists Over Cuba

U.S. DENIES RACIAL CHARGE
Denounces Attack on India

Starts Interview
With Cuban Exile



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1. Letter from the Executive Board

Dear Delegates,
Greetings!

Firstly, we would like to welcome you to the United Nations Historical Security Council. It is indeed an honour to serve as your Executive Board. For three days, this committee will witness deliberation upon an agenda that is inspired by contemporary powerplay, but is deeply rooted in historical quagmire. We hope that through this study guide, you gain essential insights about the agenda, its temporal setting, and understand the flow of this committee.

In current times of diplomatic friction, relics of the Cold War shape the strategic positioning of global superpowers amidst an unstable geopolitical backdrop. What is common is history. With this notion, we put forward the agenda, “Deliberating on the Power Struggle and Rising Intervention in Cold War Latin America (1954-1974).” The freeze date of this committee is 1st January, 1974.

Riven by the West’s capitalism and the East’s communism, Latin America became one of the most significant arenas of Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Throughout this period, intervention became a hallmark of Latin American politics. Foreign powers influenced domestic governance through covert operations, military alliances, propaganda campaigns, and economic pressure. Simultaneously, internal power struggles between military regimes, revolutionary organisations, nationalist leaders, and civilian governments destabilised several states. Coups and dictatorial rule became frequent, as governments justified repression in the name of combating communism. Be it the 1954 Guatemalan coup or the widespread guerrilla movements, the 1959 Cuban Revolution accompanied by the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis or the United States intervention policies, even clashes with Marxist ideologies; this ambit is broad but its mission is specific. That is, instilling peace in Latin America.

We request you to consider no use of future knowledge, no references to events after 1 January 1974, no modern terminology unless historically appropriate, and no hindsight-based speeches.

For further clarity, in the years before 1954, policies and institutions that had a direct effect on the timeline under discussion is also considered admissible in committee proceedings. Whereas, the freeze date serves as the defining limitation of this committee. Events occurring after this date are considered unknown and cannot influence debate, policy, or diplomatic strategy. Within this historical setting, we urge you to navigate the complexities of Cold War diplomacy while balancing national interests. The Historical Security Council therefore functions as a simulation of the Security Council not as it exists today, but as it operated during one of the most volatile and ideologically polarised periods in modern history.



You are expected to conduct research, compile possible discussion points, questions, and plausible responses with sources beyond the pages of this background guide. Embrace the intellectual energy within the group; focus on speaking and presenting, but also on actively listening, appreciating viewpoints, and learning from the myriad of perspectives this Council will offer.

We eagerly await your participation! For any questions, don't hesitate in reaching out to us via email at dcmunhsc@gmail.com.

Regards,

Deveshwari Singh
Chairperson.

Avyaan Bhargava.
Vice-chairperson

Khushagra Jain
Rapporteur





2. Introduction to the Committee

I. Overview of the United Nations Historical Security Council

The United Nations Historical Security Council (UNHSC) is a specialised simulation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that recreates the diplomatic, political and strategic realities of a specific historical period. In this committee, delegates are transported back in time and are expected to represent the policies, alliances and geopolitical interests of their assigned countries exactly as they existed during the designated historical era. Unlike the contemporary UNSC, the UNHSC does not function with present-day knowledge, institutions, or outcomes; instead, it operates strictly within the historical freeze date established for the committee.

The UNHSC retains the same institutional structure, authority, and procedural framework as the UNSC. Established under the principles of the United Nations Charter, it possesses the authority to deliberate upon threats to international peace and security, recommend diplomatic solutions, impose sanctions, authorise peacekeeping initiatives, and respond to crises through collective international action. Delegates in the committee are expected to engage with issues using the same mechanisms available to the Security Council during the historical period being simulated.

However, what distinguishes the UNHSC from the modern UNSC is its strict adherence to historical context. Every discussion, directive, alliance and policy decision must remain confined to the political realities, technological capabilities, diplomatic relations and international developments that existed before the committee's freeze date. Delegates cannot reference future events, modern treaties, later political developments, or outcomes unknown to states at the time. The committee therefore functions as a historically recreated Security Council, preserving both the institutional powers of the UNSC and the uncertainty of real-time historical decision-making.

II. Mandate, Functions, and Powers & Temporal Setting

Mandate, Functions and Powers

Similar to the contemporary Security Council, the mandate of the Historical Security Council is to maintain international peace and security, and to take action whenever peace and security is threatened. The Council's authority is particularly relevant with respect to the UN's four primary purposes, as specified in the Charter of the United Nations:

maintaining international peace and security; developing friendly relations among nations; cooperating in solving international problems; promoting respect for human rights, as well as



being a centre for harmonising the actions of nations. Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of the United Nations specifically concern the Council and the range of actions that can be taken when:

Sanctions: Pursuant to Article 41 in the Charter, the Council can call its members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or end violence. These include economic sanctions, financial penalties and restrictions, travel bans, severance of diplomatic relations, and blockades, among others. It may further mandate arms embargoes, enforce disarmament, or call upon international criminal mechanisms to become active.

Diplomatic Tools: The Council has a mandate to investigate any dispute or situation that might lead to aggressions between states or other non-state groups or within states' national territories. In order to do so, it may "recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement; formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments; determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and recommend what action should be taken."

Military Action: Besides the above-mentioned diplomatic instruments, the Council may also take military action against a state or other entity threatening international peace and security and may further decide on the deployment of troops or observers. Article 39 of the Charter states that the Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. Due to the voting structure, some regions of the world are underrepresented and others use their veto to block draft resolutions. The Security Council may also decide upon the deployment of new UN peacekeeping operations to be led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as well as the extensions of their mandates and subsequent modification or drawdown of any.

Partnerships: The Council also cooperates with a number of international and regional organisations as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to implement its decisions. Cooperation between the Security Council and UN-related organisations, such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency, is significant; but partnerships with independent intergovernmental organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the African Union are also of paramount importance for addressing a broad range of issues such as terrorism, disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, extreme violence from non-state actors, among others.

Temporal Setting

The United Nations Historical Security Council (UNHSC) is set within the geopolitical realities of the Cold War era, specifically focusing on the period between **1954 and 1974**, with a committee freeze date of **1st January, 1974**. **In the years before 1954, policies and institutions**



that had a direct effect on the timeline under discussion are also considered admissible in committee proceedings. The committee recreates the international atmosphere of the mid-twentieth century, defined by the intense rivalry between the capitalist West and the communist East, which transformed Latin America into a major arena of Cold War competition. During these two decades, the region experienced coups, revolutions, insurgencies, foreign intervention, military dictatorships, and growing superpower influence. The fear of communist expansion, alongside rising anti-imperialist and socialist movements, shaped the policies of both regional governments and global powers. Delegates must operate strictly within the political, diplomatic, military, and economic circumstances that existed during this historical timeframe.

III. Case Study: UNSC Engagement during the Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis began after the United States discovered Soviet nuclear missile installations in Cuba in October, 1962. In response to this, the then U.S. President John F. Kennedy announced a naval “quarantine” around Cuba on 22 October, 1962, to stop further Soviet shipments. Yet, the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev denied all alleged aggressive intentions and described the weapons as defensive.

The Security Council convened emergency meetings from 23rd to 25th October, 1962 after receiving complaints from Cuba, the USSR, and the United States. On considering all three complaints simultaneously, the council assessed stances of all three stakeholders. At the meetings, the United States argued that Soviet missiles in Cuba created a direct nuclear threat to the Western Hemisphere and endangered international peace. The U.S. representative presented evidence that offensive missile bases were being secretly constructed in Cuba. Whereas, the Soviet Union accused the United States of aggression and claimed that the American naval blockade violated the UN Charter. The USSR argued that only the Security Council had authority to authorize enforcement measures. Meanwhile, Cuba defended its sovereign right to self-defence and stated that Soviet weapons were purely defensive. Cuba accused the United States of repeated provocations, sabotage, and violations of Cuban airspace and waters.

The Council primarily prevented immediate escalation by providing a diplomatic platform where both superpowers could publicly argue instead of traditionally resorting to military action. This helped slow escalation during one of the most dangerous moments of the Cold War. The United States portrayed Soviet missiles as a threat to world peace, while the USSR framed the American blockade as illegal aggression. Acting Secretary-General U Thant played a crucial mediating role. The Security Council eventually adjourned discussions on 25 October 1962 to allow negotiations and diplomatic efforts assisted by U Thant to continue. Both sides attempted to gain international support through the UN. Although the UNSC became the centre of diplomatic engagement, Cold War rivalry and veto politics limited its ability to take decisive collective action. The actual settlement emerged mainly through direct negotiations between Washington and Moscow.



For sake of clarity, the crisis lost traction when the leaders of both superpowers recognized the devastating possibility of a nuclear war and publicly agreed to a deal in which the Soviets would dismantle the weapon sites in exchange for a pledge from the United States not to invade Cuba.


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3. The Cold War in the Western Hemisphere

I. Bipolar Power Structure: USA VS USSR

The formation of the bipolar power structure in the wake of World War II had a significant impact on international politics and set the foundation for the onset of the Cold War. The pre-war politics were characterized by the dominance of many European powers like Britain, France, and Germany; nevertheless, the impact of the war had severely affected all of these countries economically and militarily, thereby making a power vacuum which was occupied by the US and the USSR. The two countries had become superpowers because of their military might, industrialization, ideology, and capability of projecting their power outside their own territories. Both countries had collaborated against Nazi Germany during the war; however, their opposing political and economic systems made them rivals.

The US was propagating liberalism and capitalism, whereas the Soviet Union was advocating socialism and communism. This ideological split was reflected in contrasting plans for the international system after World War II and also led to a growing mistrust between the two superpowers. The creation of bodies like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by the US and the Warsaw Pact by the Soviet Union institutionalized the split of the world into opposite camps. The US also strengthened its influence through alliances such as the Rio Pact in Latin America to contain communism. This resulted in a literal as well as metaphorical division of Europe with its eastern and western parts separated by the so-called “Iron Curtain” coined by Winston Churchill. It should be noted that the bipolar system affected not only military relations but almost every sphere of global politics during the Cold War era. The superpowers competed for dominance across the entire globe by promoting their respective ideologies, using economic and cultural influence, engaging in political struggles, and fighting on the technological frontlines. Both parties tried to extend their spheres of influence in the regions of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. The US promoted its ideology by implementing policies like the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, and the USSR dominated the countries of Eastern Europe and promoted socialism throughout the rest of the world. The invention of nuclear arms escalated the conflict even more, resulting in an equilibrium of terror where mutual destruction was guaranteed in the event of war, making any military confrontation between the two states highly perilous. Thus, the bipolar power configuration became the dominant force in international relations during the latter half of the twentieth century, shaping events such as decolonization, regional wars, international organizations, and geopolitics until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.



II. Strategic Power of Latin America

It is the proximity to the US of Latin America and the ideological significance, as well as the wealth in resources of the region, that defined the strategic importance of Latin America during the Cold War period. It is important to remember that historically the United States considered itself the hegemonic power in the Western Hemisphere on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine that did not only prohibit foreign intervention into American affairs but also served as a blueprint for the policy of control and dominance in the region. In the wake of the end of WWII, it became clear to US politicians that the economic vulnerability and political instability in Latin America could facilitate the growth of socialist-communist movements under Soviet patronage. Therefore, Latin America came to play an extremely important role within the wider context of containing Soviet expansion.

Latin America was of great economic value to the USA owing to numerous natural resources, agricultural products, and naval facilities. Large American companies had substantial stakes in the oil industry, mining, bananas, coffee, and sugar plantations of Latin American countries. It was necessary to ensure political stability and pro-American regimes for the sake of economic interests in the region. Strategically located zones, such as the Panama Canal, elevated the geopolitical value of Latin America due to the possibility to exert control over traffic in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In turn, unequal distribution of land property, poverty, and an oppressive regime characterized the majority of Latin American countries, leading to revolutions and the growth of socialistic tendencies. The success of the Cuban Revolution increased the fear of potential spread of socialist ideas in the rest of the countries in the Western Hemisphere.

However, Latin America was not important for the USA only from a military point of view; the issue was much more complex and ideological than this. Containment policy entailed the active participation of the country in the life of other states in the form of providing financial aid, exercising diplomacy, conducting joint military actions, and engaging in various kinds of interventions. It is noteworthy that the US supported any anti-communist regime, regardless of whether it adhered to democratic principles or not; and also led to several interventions.



III. The Emergence of the “Red Scare”

The outbreak of the Red Scare during the early stages of the Cold War emerged from growing fears regarding the spread of communism and the intensifying ideological rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union after the Second World War. Although anti-communist sentiment had existed earlier, concerns escalated significantly after 1945 as communist governments expanded across Eastern Europe and revolutionary movements gained visibility in other parts of the world. The ideological confrontation between capitalism and communism increasingly shaped both domestic and foreign policy, leading many governments to perceive socialist organizations, labor movements, and leftist political groups as potential threats to national stability.

In the United States, the Red Scare intensified following developments such as the Soviet Union’s successful nuclear test in 1949 and the Communist victory in China the same year. These events heightened fears of espionage, ideological infiltration, and internal subversion. Government bodies such as the House Un-American Activities Committee launched investigations into alleged communist influence within the military, academia, media, and public institutions. Public figures such as Joseph McCarthy became strongly associated with militant anti-communism, often advancing speculative or unverified accusations regarding political disloyalty. This atmosphere of suspicion contributed to blacklisting, censorship, dismissals from employment, and widespread public anxiety throughout the 1950s.

The Red Scare also had major implications for international relations. Fear of communist expansion encouraged the adoption of containment policies and increased foreign involvement aimed at limiting leftist influence abroad. Governments across different regions strengthened surveillance measures, enacted stricter security legislation, and expanded military cooperation in the name of national defense. In several cases, anti-communism became closely linked with broader concerns surrounding national security and political stability, occasionally leading to allegations of excessive state control and restrictions on civil liberties. Consequently, the Red Scare evolved beyond a domestic political phenomenon and became a defining feature of the wider Cold War order.



IV. CASE STUDY: USA Containment Strategy in Latin America.

The American policy of containment during the Cold War era in Latin America was mainly geared toward ensuring the prevention of the spread of communism. Containment had long been an official strategy in U.S. foreign policy since the beginning of the Cold War era, with a historical basis dating back to the Monroe Doctrine. The U.S. government regarded Latin America as one of the spheres of influence where any attempt by socialism or the Soviet Union to establish itself would be considered a threat to American national security. In the aftermath of World War II, concerns mounted regarding poverty, ineffective governance, and social and political instability, which might lead to revolutionaries with a pro-Soviet agenda taking power. Hence, the United States adopted an anti-communism stance in its policies toward Latin America, sometimes overlooking democracy.

The strategy of containment involved multiple tactics, including economic assistance, diplomacy, military cooperation, and espionage activities. Examples of the economic strategies included initiatives like the Alliance for Progress, which sought to reduce poverty in the region to undermine revolutionary movements. Institutions like the School of the Americas were training Latin American military officials in countering insurgencies. On the other hand, the CIA was engaged in secret operations to overthrow governments seen as friendly to socialism or unfriendly to the interests of the United States.

The intervention in several countries came to serve as a case study for this policy. For example, the United States assisted in organizing resistance against the socialist regime of Salvador Allende, which led to the Chilean coup d'état. Likewise, the country supported rebel Contra groups fighting the left-wing Sandinista government in the decade of 1980s. This was part of a larger policy of containing the Soviets in the region by means of indirect interventions and backing of anti-communist regimes. Thus, U.S. containment policies heavily influenced politics in Latin America, which resulted in the rise of authoritarian regimes and political instability in the area.

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4. Ideological Conflict and Political Transformation

I. Rise of Socialist and Revolutionary Movements

The development of socialist and revolutionary movements during the Cold War period was largely associated with the prevailing economic inequalities, social deprivation and political dissatisfaction with authoritarianism in different parts of the world. In many countries under development, wealth and ownership were in the hands of a few elites while the majority of people had to live in poor conditions lacking employment opportunities and education facilities, besides being politically marginalized. This situation encouraged movements to seek social justice, equitable distribution of resources, and national sovereignty. Influenced by Marxism and socialism, these leaders and movements believed that the prevailing political system was designed only to benefit the elites and foreigners. Socialist movements emerged as a result of competition in ideology between the US and the USSR. The USSR declared itself an ally of revolutionary movements against imperialism and offered ideological and financial assistance and even military support to revolutionary movements. The Chinese Communist Revolution and Cuban Revolution proved to be successful and served as a source of inspiration for other revolutions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Che Guevara provided Furthermore, it helped promote guerrilla warfare and revolution as a means to create systemic transformation, especially in countries where participatory democracy was either nonexistent or ineffective.

A number of revolutions employed armed insurgency as their primary strategy, contending that reform could not occur under regimes where there were military leaders who supported them. Numerous guerrillas and socialist parties sprang up across the world, organizing peasants, workers, and students in order to fight for land reform, labor rights, and independence. Governments often used counterinsurgency tactics, extended military control, and limited civil liberties, sometimes with the help of other nations through the principle of Containment. These resulted in political violence and civil unrest in many countries during the Cold War. Overall, the emergence of socialist and revolutionary movements became an essential element of the Cold War era.



II. Democratic Socialism vs Armed Insurgency

The conflict between democratic socialism and revolution in the time of the Cold War can be seen as two contrasting approaches to political and social change in societies that were suffering from inequalities, poverty, and authoritarianism. Democratic socialism advocated for peaceful change via elections, constitutional means and reform. It emphasized land reform, nationalization of key industries, labor rights, and social policy, all the while ensuring the preservation of democracy, civil rights, and multiparty politics. Its adherents believed that social and economic changes can be implemented slowly via democratic means. On the other hand, revolution implied that ruling classes and authoritarian governments will never permit change peacefully. The supporters of revolutionary changes believed that corrupt regimes have corrupted and undermined democratic structures making a revolutionary uprising and violence the only way to implement change.

However, the distinction between the two becomes even more pronounced under the increased hostility of Cold War era between the USA and the USSR, as the democratic socialist governments and parties were often suspiciously eyed by their opponents regardless of their peaceful approach via elections and Legal institutions were used to fight for democratic socialism, while revolutionary groups who wanted to establish a socialist government would sometimes receive aid from foreign socialists. The philosophy of revolutionaries like Karl Marx shaped both forms of activism. However, while democratic socialists modified socialist philosophies for use within democratic systems, revolutionaries like Vladimir Lenin used more radical ideologies, and some even embraced guerrilla warfare techniques championed by Che Guevara. The methods used in both cases presented challenges. For instance, democratic socialism would face economic constraints, as well as opposition from hostile countries that feared the spread of socialism. On the other hand, armed insurgents would often start a civil war, and sometimes the conflict would result in humanitarian issues such as political violence. Governments that fought with insurgent groups would have to enhance their military capabilities, implement strict security laws, and even limit freedoms under the containment policy. Overall, the clash of ideologies presented by democratic socialism and armed revolution would shape politics during the Cold War period and beyond.



III. CASE STUDY: Rise Of Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution.

Understanding the ascendancy of Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolution requires placing them in the context of the socio-political climate in Cuba during the mid-twentieth century. Before the revolution, Cuba had been ruled by Fulgencio Batista, who took power via a military coup in 1952. Although his government was marked by oppression, censorship, and militarization, it brought about economic prosperity in some industries. However, wealth was still concentrated in the hands of the elite, leaving a significant percentage of the rural population in poverty and lacking land ownership. Moreover, the country's robust economic relationship with the US, especially in the sugar industry, increased its dependence on external influence, fueling nationalist sentiments among Cubans.

The revolution became a reaction to these circumstances, receiving backing from various classes in society, such as the students, peasants, and middle classes. Led by Fidel Castro and aided by comrades like Che Guevara, the revolutionaries attempted to unseat the government through the failed attack on the Moncada barracks. Despite failure, it was a symbolic beginning of the revolution. Exile and organization led Fidel Castro back to his homeland, where he was able to create a guerrilla camp in the Sierra Maestra mountains; there, the revolution used tactics of rural insurgency, propaganda, and expansion of territory, leveraging the decreasing legitimacy of the Batista government.

To be able to evaluate the success of the revolution, it is necessary to understand the development of the strategy behind it. Besides military maneuvers, it is important to recognize the significance of political discourse, focusing on ideas of nationalism and justice without clear adherence to ideology at an earlier stage. As corruption, opposition from inside, and economic problems were undermining the power of the Batista government, the revolutionary forces gained strength, ultimately resulting in a victory over Batista in January 1959. In this manner, it was possible for Castro to gain control over the country, implementing new measures such as land redistribution, nationalization, and other measures that resulted in an alignment with the Soviet Union.

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5. Structural Causes of Instability

I. Land Inequality and Agrarian Crisis.

Inequality in landownership and the agrarian crisis were some of the critical structural issues that played an essential role in creating political and social insecurity during the period of the Cold War in the developing world, considering that agriculture was the principal source of income in these countries. There were usually small groups of elites who held most of the fertile lands, while big numbers of rural dwellers were tenant farmers or sharecroppers with no land or any other form of security. Such land inequalities led to various social tensions in the rural areas since they had low incomes, debts, and inadequate means to utilize modern agricultural techniques. Agrarian crisis is generally a term used to describe the crisis of agriculture caused by poor yields, old-fashioned practices, excessive population in relation to available land, inadequacies in finance and technology, and underdeveloped rural infrastructures. Such circumstances led to underproduction of foods to meet the demands of increasing rural populations hence causing unemployment, poverty, and rural-to-urban migrations. Consequently, the production of food did not increase enough to accommodate the increasing population in rural areas, resulting in unemployment, poverty, and migration from rural to urban centers. This problem resulted in further deterioration of living standards and widening the gap between rich and poor. One must realize that inequality in terms of land ownership and the agricultural crisis were other factors contributing to political unrest and revolution during this time. The rural people, under the influence of the teachings of Karl Marx, started demanding an equal distribution of land resources and economic reforms in the country. It was difficult for governments to implement land reforms because the landowners were always against such steps. In the larger context of the policy of Containment, these internal problems were exacerbated by external influences on the government by foreign entities, which supported governments opposing land reforms because they feared the spread of socialist revolutions. Consequently, the production of food did not increase enough to accommodate the increasing population in rural areas, resulting in unemployment, poverty, and migration from rural to urban centers. This problem resulted in further deterioration of living standards and widening the gap between rich and poor.

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II. Economic Dependence and Weak Institutions.

During the Cold War era, some major difficulties that played a significant role in determining the development of states included economic dependency and weak institutional structures in these countries. In terms of economic dependency, it could be observed in how most nations relied on either the capitalist system controlled by America or the socialist system led by the Soviet Union. As a result, such dependency meant that the respective nation would not have been able to formulate its own independent economic strategies and policies.

Another challenge associated with institutional weakness was apparent in the manner in which the political and administrative structure of several countries found it hard to maintain stability within the nation-state. In most instances, the institution itself was relatively new or affected by some form of civil unrest, corruption, or even foreign interference. The need to realize the effects of economic dependence along with weak institutions made the world more polarized under the dominance of America and the USSR. Both the nations utilized economic aid, military, and political cooperation to extend their influence to other countries, who favored their ideology in many ways. This resulted in further polarization in terms of capitalism and socialism along with making a mark on the politics of many countries during that time.

III. CASE STUDY: Agrarian Reforms Under Jacobo Árbenz.

Guatemala experienced agrarian reforms when Jacobo Arbenz issued Decree 900 in order to counter the land inequality in the country during the Cold War. This reform addressed the unequal distribution of land, whereby a minority of rich people had possession of productive land, while a larger population did not own any land or were trapped in tenancy arrangements. The land reform program enabled peasants to obtain unused land that belonged to big estates through compulsory acquisition by providing compensation to the owners according to their tax valuations.

The stakeholders in this reform included the Guatemalan peasantry, which welcomed this initiative because it helped them gain access to land, the landowning elites within Guatemala who strongly condemned the policy since they stood to lose economically and politically, the

government of Arbenz which viewed the reform as a step towards modernizing the society, and the United Fruit Company, an international economic entity with enormous plantations in Guatemala. However, very soon, the agrarian reform turned into a geopolitical problem in terms of Containment doctrine, when the United States viewed it as the opportunity for communist infiltration in the Western hemisphere, especially taking into account that this reform affected foreign corporations and general anxiety regarding leftist influences in Latin American countries. It was speculated that the United States intervened in this case covertly and supported opposition groups through the secret operation named PBSUCCESS, which was focused on conducting psychological operations and provoking political instability. Facing internal opposition from elites and the army as well as pressure from the outside, Árbenz had to resign and leave office in 1954.



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6. Doctrines and Legality of Intervention

I. Evolution of United States' Interventionist Policies with respect to Latin America

On December 2nd 1823 President James Monroe delivered his annual message to Congress, which later came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine. In his address, the President declared three principles that would come to define U.S. foreign policy:

1. The Western Hemisphere was closed to future colonization by any European powers.
2. The U.S. would not interfere in the internal affairs or wars of European nations, and expected Europe to stay out of the Western Hemisphere.
3. Any attempt by European powers to intervene, oppress, or control nations in the Western Hemisphere would be viewed as a dangerous act of hostility against the United States.

This policy was invoked multiple times over the course of the 19th century. For instance, in 1845 and again in 1848, President James Knox Polk reiterated Monroe's principles in warning Britain and Spain not to establish footholds in Oregon, California, or Mexico's Yucatán Peninsula. Polk reinterpreted the doctrine in terms of the prevailing spirit of Manifest Destiny.

Then in 1904, European nations blockaded Venezuela to extract payment on defaulted loans. Spurred on by the fear that European powers would seize territory, President Theodore Roosevelt declared that the U.S. had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of Latin American and Caribbean nations to prevent European powers from doing the same, effectively making the U.S. the "international police power" of the Western Hemisphere. This proclamation, known today as the Roosevelt Corollary, was added to the Doctrine to give effect to Roosevelt's "Big Stick Diplomacy" policy.

However in 1933, Theodore's cousin Franklin D. Roosevelt implemented the Good Neighbour Policy, an official renunciation of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. This signified a fundamental shift in United States foreign policy away from military interventionism and towards a cooperative, non-interventionist approach with Latin American nations.

As of present day, the United States' relationship with the Western Hemisphere is defined by a complex tension between the importance of non-interventionism and the necessity to curb the spread of communism. While the Monroe Doctrine remains a cornerstone of American ideology, its application has shifted from preventing European colonialism to countering Soviet influence.

II. Evolution of Russian/Soviet Interventionism with respect to Latin America

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire maintained limited political involvement within Latin America, restricting its presence largely to diplomatic and commercial relations. However, following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the establishment of the Union of



Soviet Socialist Republics, Soviet foreign policy adopted an increasingly ideological character founded upon the principles of Marxism-Leninism, anti-imperialism, and the global advancement of socialist revolution.

In 1919, the Soviet leadership established the Communist International (Comintern), an organization intended to support and coordinate communist parties and revolutionary movements internationally, including those emerging within Latin America. During the interwar years, Soviet influence within the region remained primarily political and ideological in nature.

However, following the conclusion of the Second World War and the emergence of the Cold War bipolar order, Soviet policy evolved into a broader geopolitical strategy aimed at expanding socialist influence and countering capitalist dominance within the Western Hemisphere. Soviet engagement increasingly came to be guided by the principles of proletarian internationalism and later by the Brezhnev Doctrine, which emphasized the protection and preservation of socialist governments and movements against external opposition.

Consequently, Soviet involvement in Latin America developed through indirect means including political backing, economic cooperation, military assistance, and ideological support for socialist-oriented governments and revolutionary organizations.

As it stands, the Soviet Union's policy towards Latin America had evolved into a significant component of its broader Cold War strategy, reflecting its continued commitment towards anti-colonial solidarity, revolutionary cooperation, and the global expansion of socialist influence.

III. The Truman Doctrine and Its Implication on Latin America

On March 12th, 1947, President Harry S. Truman addressed a joint session of Congress and articulated what would become one of the most consequential foreign policy declarations of the twentieth century. The Truman Doctrine established a broad and sweeping principle: that the United States would provide political, economic, and military support to any free people resisting subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures. This address is regarded as the opening declaration of the Cold War, the moment at which post-war rivalry between Washington and Moscow went from a power competition to an existential ideological conflict. Truman's speech gave the United States justification for interventionism whenever and wherever the threat of communism was perceived, particularly in Latin America. Reinterpreting the Monroe Doctrine in the language of containing communism, Washington deprioritized economic development in favor of military and police aid. This approach was institutionalized through the Rio Pact of 1947 and the formation of the Organization of American States in 1948, which bound Latin American nations into a formal anti-communist framework under heavy American influence.



IV. Case Study: Legal Debates on Intervention in Latin America

i) The first significant legal debate regarding the Monroe Doctrine came up in 1865, when France installed Archduke Maximilian of Austria as Emperor of Mexico — a direct violation of Monroe's declaration that the Western Hemisphere was closed to European political control.

With the Civil War concluded, Secretary of State William Seward issued forceful diplomatic protests to Paris and moved 50,000 Union troops to the Texas-Mexico border. France withdrew, and Maximilian was executed by Mexican republican forces in 1867. While the doctrine appeared to function as intended — as a shield against European imperialism — the episode revealed a fundamental legal weakness. The Monroe Doctrine was never a principle of international law binding upon all states, but a unilateral declaration of American policy, enforceable only by American power. Mexico was never consulted; Washington acted as the self-appointed guardian of a hemisphere that had conferred no such guardianship upon it.

ii) The second, and more consequential, legal debate arose during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Upon discovering Soviet missile installations in Cuba, the United States imposed a naval quarantine — deliberately avoiding the word "blockade," which would have constituted an act of war under international law — and secured OAS endorsement to provide multilateral cover for what was fundamentally a unilateral decision. The crisis was ultimately resolved through a private US-Soviet agreement negotiated entirely without Cuban participation, despite Cuban territory being the very subject of the deal. The Missile Crisis thus stands as the most acute illustration of the tension between the Monroe Doctrine's unilateral logic and the multilateral legal architecture of the post-war order — demonstrating that the United States would invoke international institutions when convenient, bypass them when not, and treat Latin American sovereignty as a variable to be managed rather than a principle to be respected.

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7. Mechanisms of Power and Influence

I. Covert Operations and Intelligence Networks

Latin America inherited intelligence structures that had been shaped by Cold War political policing, foreign covert operations, and the rise of powerful criminal and paramilitary networks. Across the region, states remained dependent on fragmented agencies, militarized security forces, and reactive counter-subversion mechanisms rather than coherent intelligence systems capable of safeguarding sovereignty. Consequently, many governments lacked the institutional capacity needed to counter foreign espionage, covert political interference, cartel-linked corruption, or infiltration into electoral, military, and economic domains. This widening gap between imported Cold War intelligence doctrines and Latin America's institutional realities contributed significantly to the structural vulnerabilities that defined the region's geopolitical condition during the era.

The roots of this intelligence deficit lay in the Cold War itself, when Latin American security institutions were reshaped not around defending external sovereignty, but around the geopolitical imperatives of the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Following the 1954 **speculatively CIA-backed** coup in Guatemala under Operation PBSUCCESS, intelligence structures across the region increasingly prioritized the identification and suppression of "internal enemies" suspected of communist sympathies. Rather than developing professional intelligence agencies focused on external espionage, strategic forecasting, or counterintelligence, many governments embraced the doctrine of National Security promoted through U.S. military assistance programs and institutions such as the School of the Americas. Intelligence services therefore became instruments of domestic surveillance, political repression, and counterinsurgency.

Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, covert operations and transnational intelligence networks further entrenched this model. *Public suspicion* suggested that The Central Intelligence Agency supported anti-communist military regimes and covertly influenced political outcomes in countries such as Brazil during the 1964 coup and Chile during efforts to destabilize the government of Salvador Allende before the 1973 coup led by Augusto Pinochet. *However, these claims were denied by the CIA.* Simultaneously, revolutionary organizations such as the Cuban-supported guerrilla movements established their own clandestine intelligence and communication networks across the continent after the Cuban Revolution. In response, military governments increasingly coordinated intelligence-sharing and counter-insurgency operations.

By 1974, intelligence institutions in much of Latin America had therefore evolved primarily as tools of ideological control and regime security rather than as modern agencies capable of independent strategic assessment or protection against foreign covert penetration. This legacy left many states institutionally weakened, heavily militarized, and deeply vulnerable to external influence throughout the remainder of the Cold War.



II. Military Coups and Counter-Insurgency

During the Cold War, counterinsurgency operations and military-backed political transitions became important components of U.S. policy in Latin America, shaped largely by the broader objective of containing the spread of communism after the Cuban Revolution. One of the earliest and most significant examples was the 1954 overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala through the alleged CIA-supported Operation PBSUCCESS. This led to the employment of psychological operations, economic pressure, and support for rebel forces under Carlos Castillo Armas to weaken Árbenz's government, which Washington perceived as vulnerable to communist influence due to its agrarian reforms and political orientation. The coup led to the establishment of a military-led government that reversed several reforms and expanded internal security measures, contributing to prolonged political instability and counterinsurgency conflict in Guatemala.

Counterinsurgency efforts expanded further after the Cuban Revolution. The United States increased cooperation with anti-communist governments and supported the training of Latin American military and intelligence forces under the doctrine of National Security. Across the region, security institutions increasingly concentrated on combating guerrilla movements, monitoring political dissent, and containing left-wing revolutionary activity. In countries such as Brazil and Chile, U.S. policy involved diplomatic engagement, covert assistance, and support for opposition sectors within societies experiencing intense ideological polarization.

In Chile, the United States undertook extensive covert and diplomatic efforts in relation to the government of Salvador Allende between 1970 and 1973. U.S. officials provided support to opposition media and political groups, limited Chile's access to certain forms of international financial assistance, and sought to influence political developments during a period of growing economic and social unrest. These developments preceded the 1973 military coup led by Augusto Pinochet, after which Chile entered a prolonged period of military rule characterized by centralized intelligence operations and counterinsurgency policies. During this period, U.S. security strategy purportedly increasingly emphasized covert operations and indirect forms of intervention.

Collectively, these developments strengthened the political role of military institutions across Latin America between 1954 and 1974. Intelligence and security agencies became increasingly focused on internal stability and ideological threats, often prioritizing domestic counter-insurgency over external defense. As a result, the Cold War transformed counter-insurgency into both a domestic security framework and a geopolitical instrument used by the United States and allied governments to contain revolutionary movements and preserve regional stability within the broader context of East–West competition.



III. Case Study: Role of the Central Intelligence Agency in Regime Change

The Alleged Role of the CIA in Regional Conflicts (1954–1974):

Throughout the Cold War, the United States publicly positioned itself as a defender against the spread of communism. Across Latin America, however, a series of political upheavals, military coups, and anti-socialist campaigns led to growing international suspicion regarding the covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). During the period between 1954 and 1974, the CIA consistently denied allegations that it had orchestrated or backed military coups in sovereign states. At the time, much of the evidence remained circumstantial, and claims of CIA involvement were largely treated as allegations advanced by journalists, political opponents, leftist movements, and foreign observers.

In 1954, the overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Árbenz generated some of the earliest and strongest suspicions of covert American interference in Latin America. Árbenz's land reforms and attempts to nationalise foreign corporate interests, particularly those linked to American businesses, were perceived in Washington as signs of growing socialist influence. Armed groups led by Carlos Castillo Armas seized power following an insurgency that many critics alleged had been secretly supported by the CIA under a covert initiative later associated with "Operation PBSuccess." At the time, however, US officials denied direct involvement, portraying the events as an internal Guatemalan uprising against communist expansion.

Similar suspicions emerged after the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion in Cuba. Following the rise of Fidel Castro in 1959, anti-Castro Cuban exiles began receiving training and logistical support from actors widely believed to be connected to US intelligence networks. Although the administration of John F. Kennedy acknowledged American support for anti-Castro efforts after the invasion failed in 1961, the extent of CIA planning and operational control remained publicly obscured for years. The CIA itself rejected accusations that it had directly engineered an attempted regime change operation.

During the 1960s, political instability across countries such as Brazil, Ecuador, and Bolivia further intensified allegations of covert CIA interference. In Brazil, critics argued that the destabilisation of President João Goulart — whose government pursued nationalist economic reforms and maintained ties with socialist states — was aided by covert American funding of anti-communist groups and politicians before the 1964 military coup. Likewise, in Ecuador and Bolivia, suspicions persisted that US intelligence networks were quietly financing anti-leftist organisations, labour movements, and military factions to curb Soviet and Cuban influence in the region. American authorities repeatedly dismissed these accusations as propaganda or Cold War misinformation.

Perhaps the most internationally controversial allegations emerged in Chile during the presidency of Salvador Allende. Allende's socialist programme and plans to nationalise major industries alarmed American policymakers amid the broader Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union.

Throughout the early 1970s, journalists and political activists accused the CIA of secretly funding opposition groups, encouraging economic destabilisation, and supporting anti-Allende forces before the 1973 military coup led by Augusto Pinochet. At the time, the US government and the CIA denied direct responsibility for the coup, insisting that Chile's political crisis was the result of domestic tensions rather than foreign intervention. For much of this era, concrete proof of CIA involvement remained inaccessible to the public.



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8. Regional Case Studies: Revolutions and Coups

I. Guatemala (1954)

Elected in 1950 with 65% of the popular vote, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán was a constitutionally and democratically legitimate head of government by any standard recognised in international law. His Decree 900 of June 1952 expropriated unused agricultural land from large estates, redistributing it to landless peasant families at the land's own declared tax value — entirely within Guatemala's sovereign constitutional authority. The Guatemalan Communist Party, the PGT, held four seats in a Congress of fifty-six, and Guatemala maintained no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Among the land expropriated, however, was unused holdings of the United Fruit Company, a US corporation whose lobbying campaign had successfully framed Guatemala's land reform as a communist threat in Washington — where Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and CIA Director Allen Dulles had both held prior professional relationships with the company.

At the Tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas in March 1954, Dulles secured a resolution declaring that domination of any American state by the international communist movement constituted a threat to hemispheric peace. Guatemala voted against; Argentina and Mexico abstained. Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello argued before the conference that the resolution was a mechanism to designate any reformist government as communist and subject it to collective action. It carried no binding legal force under the OAS Charter or Rio Pact, but established the political groundwork for June.

On 18 June 1954, Guatemalan exiles entered from Honduras and El Salvador while aircraft struck Guatemala City. Washington characterised this as a spontaneous internal uprising — its official position as of 1 January 1974. Árbenz, in his resignation address of 27 June, publicly accused the United States of directing the operation, a claim sustained by international journalists present in Guatemala City whose reporting on the exile force's aircraft, equipment, and external coordination was inconsistent with the official account. No US document confirming or denying involvement has been released to date.

Guatemala formally requested a UN Security Council investigation on 19 June, which the United States vetoed, arguing OAS competence under Article 52 of the UN Charter. A Soviet ceasefire proposal was similarly blocked. The OAS investigative committee produced no findings before Árbenz resigned.

II. Bay of Pigs Invasion (1961)

Following the Cuban Revolution of January 1959 and the severance of US-Cuban diplomatic relations on 3 January 1961, approximately 1,400 Cuban exiles — organised into Brigade 2506, trained at camps in Guatemala from 1960, and equipped with US government support — landed at Playa Girón and Playa Larga on 17 April 1961. Cuban forces defeated the landing within 72 hours. 1,189 members of the exile force were captured and 114 were killed. The decision to withhold US air cover during the operation was publicly debated in the American press in the



weeks that followed. On 24 April 1961, President Kennedy accepted public responsibility for the operation. Cuba had brought the matter before the UN General Assembly before the invasion, presenting evidence of the Guatemalan training camps and alleging an imminent attack; no binding action was taken. The episode was subsequently debated in the Security Council without resolution. Whether the operation constituted aggression under the UN Charter, and whether it violated Articles 19 and 20 of the OAS Charter, was formally raised by multiple Latin American governments — most notably Mexico — and remains an open legal question to date.

III. Chile (1973)

Salvador Allende won the Chilean presidential election on 4 September 1970 with 36.2% of the vote in a three-way race — a plurality sufficient under Chilean constitutional law to trigger confirmation by the Chilean Congress, which voted to confirm him on 24 October 1970. He was inaugurated on 3 November 1970, becoming the first democratically elected Marxist head of government in the Western Hemisphere. His Unidad Popular coalition proceeded to nationalise the Chilean copper industry — previously majority-owned by US corporations including Anaconda and Kennecott — through a constitutional amendment passed unanimously by the Chilean Congress in July 1971.

The United States government's public hostility to the Allende government was a matter of open diplomatic record from the outset. Multilateral lending institutions including the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Export-Import Bank ceased extending credit to Chile during this period. Whether this reflected independent institutional assessment or coordinated external pressure remains, as of 1 January 1974, a matter of public allegation rather than confirmed fact. Allende addressed the UN General Assembly on 4 December 1972, publicly accusing the United States government and transnational corporations — specifically ITT and the copper companies — of conducting organised economic aggression against Chile. His address is on the permanent record of the General Assembly.

On 11 September 1973, the Chilean military bombed the presidential palace, La Moneda. President Allende died inside. General Augusto Pinochet assumed power, dissolved Congress, banned political parties, and launched a campaign of detention and repression against political opponents. The National Stadium in Santiago was used as a detention centre, and the killing and torture of political prisoners was reported by international journalists and foreign nationals present in Chile within days of the coup. The United States extended diplomatic recognition to the Pinochet government rapidly. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's prior public statements of hostility toward the Allende government are on the record. Rumours and allegations of the United States' operational involvement in the coup have been rampant, particularly in reporting by journalist Seymour Hersh in the New York Times in September and October 1973. However as it stands, nothing has been confirmed or denied.



IV. Case Study: Overthrow of Salvador Allende and Rise of Augusto Pinochet

On 11 September 1973, Chilean Air Force jets bombed La Moneda presidential palace in Santiago. Ground forces stormed the building. President Allende died inside — whether by his own hand or otherwise remains disputed and unresolved. General Augusto Pinochet assumed power the same day, heading a four-man military junta that immediately dissolved the Chilean Congress, banned political parties, imposed a nationwide curfew, and declared a state of siege. In the days and weeks that followed, the National Stadium in Santiago was used as a detention and processing centre for political prisoners. International journalists present in Chile, foreign nationals who were themselves detained, and representatives of foreign governments reported killings and torture occurring within the stadium and at other detention sites across the country.

The International Commission of Jurists dispatched a preliminary mission to Chile in late 1973; its findings, reported publicly, documented a pattern of systematic abuse. The political responses came quickly. Mexico, Venezuela, and Cuba broke diplomatic relations with the Pinochet junta within days of the coup. The United States extended recognition rapidly, and Secretary of State Kissinger's public characterisation of the Allende government in prior months had made Washington's sympathies transparent. The UN General Assembly debated the human rights situation in Chile in October 1973; the debate is on the public record but produced no binding resolution. Allende's foreign minister, Clodomiro Almeyda, addressed the General Assembly in exile, formally contesting the legitimacy of the junta before the international community. As of 1 January 1974, thousands of Chilean citizens remain in detention. The whereabouts of a significant number of individuals arrested in the immediate aftermath of the coup are unaccounted for. The junta's consolidation of power is ongoing, and the reports emerging from Chile — through journalists, foreign embassies, and international human rights organisations — continue to document conditions that multiple member states have formally characterised as incompatible with basic standards of international humanitarian law. The question of external involvement in the coup itself remains publicly alleged and officially denied, with no forum yet identified that is capable of resolving it.



9. Insurgencies and Counter-Movements

I. Guerrilla Warfare and Revolutionary Expansion

The Cuban Revolution of January 1959 was the first show of a small guerrilla force being able to defeat a US-backed military government and hold power. Its immediate effect was the proliferation of guerrilla movements across Latin America, each drawing in varying degrees on the Cuban model of rural insurgency and peasant mobilisation.

In Venezuela, the Armed Forces of National Liberation, the FALN, launched an urban and rural insurgency against the democratically elected government of Rómulo Betancourt from 1962, receiving, by Venezuela's formal allegation before the OAS, material support from Cuba. The OAS investigated and sanctioned Cuba in 1964 on this basis — one of the few instances in which the organisation applied its collective security provisions against Cuba rather than on behalf of US interests.

In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the FARC, and the National Liberation Army, the ELN, emerged in 1964, the former with roots in the Liberal-Conservative civil conflict known as La Violencia, the latter explicitly modelled on the Cuban experience and influenced by the theology of liberation.

In Bolivia, Ernesto Guevara arrived in 1966 to establish what he envisioned as a continental guerrilla front — the foco — from which revolutionary war would spread across South America. The campaign failed to attract peasant support and was decisively crushed; Guevara was captured on 8 October 1967 and killed the following day. His death marked the effective end of the foquismo model as a viable revolutionary strategy in its original form.

By the late 1960s, guerrilla movements had adapted. In Uruguay, the Tupamaros — the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional — pursued an urban strategy of bank robberies, kidnappings of prominent figures, and the public release of documents exposing government corruption, operating primarily between 1963 and 1972 before being militarily crushed by the Uruguayan Army with the assistance of US counterinsurgency training. In Argentina, the People's Revolutionary Army, the ERP, and the Montoneros — a Peronist guerrilla organisation — were active from the early 1970s, conducting kidnappings, assassinations, and armed attacks against military and corporate targets. In Brazil, several urban guerrilla organisations emerged following the 1964 coup, including the MR-8 and the ALN led by Carlos Marighella, whose 1969 Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla became a reference document for revolutionary movements globally. Marighella was killed by Brazilian security forces in November 1969.

As of 1 January 1974, active guerrilla insurgencies persist in Argentina, Colombia, and several other countries. The regional spread of armed movements — and the regional spread of the counterinsurgency apparatus deployed against them — has fundamentally altered the political landscape of Latin America.



II. State Repression and Authoritarianism

The proliferation of guerrilla movements across Latin America from the early 1960s onward was met, in country after country, with the consolidation of military governments and the systematic expansion of state security apparatus. As it stands, elected civilian governments are the exception rather than the rule across much of the hemisphere.

Brazil entered military rule following the coup of April 1964. The regime progressively tightened its grip — Institutional Act No. 5, issued in December 1968, suspended habeas corpus, closed Congress, and authorised the detention of political opponents without trial or judicial review. The systematic use of torture against political prisoners was documented by the Brazilian Bar Association, by the Catholic Church, and by foreign journalists and diplomats throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. The US government's training of Brazilian police and security forces through the Office of Public Safety — a programme operating under the USAID framework — was reported in the American press and debated in the US Congress from 1971 onward.

Bolivia experienced a succession of military governments through the 1960s and into the 1970s, punctuated by the brief left-nationalist government of General Juan José Torres, which was itself overthrown in August 1971 by General Hugo Banzer with reported support from Brazil and Argentina. The Banzer government proceeded to ban political parties and trade unions and detain and torture political opponents.

Uruguay, long regarded as one of Latin America's most stable democracies, saw its elected government progressively cede authority to the military following the campaign against the Tupamaros; by June 1973 the Uruguayan military had effectively assumed control of the state, dissolving Congress and establishing what amounts to a civilian-fronted military government.

Argentina returned to elected government in May 1973 with the election of Héctor Cámpora, followed by Juan Perón's return from exile and his election to the presidency in September 1973 — but political violence between left and right Peronist factions, and between guerrilla organisations and security forces, continues at an acute level as of this date.



Chile is under military rule following the coup of September 1973. Paraguay has been under the dictatorship of General Alfredo Stroessner since 1954. Nicaragua remains under the Somoza family dynasty. The pattern across the hemisphere is consistent: military governments, suspension of civil liberties, the use of torture as a systematic instrument of political control, and the physical elimination of political opposition. The United States government's training of Latin American military and police personnel through the School of the Americas — established in Panama in 1946 — and through the Office of Public Safety programme is a matter of public record. The extent to which this training contributed to the methods of repression documented across the region is a matter of active public debate in the United States Congress, following Senator James Abourezk's introduction of legislation to abolish the Office of Public Safety programme.





10. Patterns of Conflict: Reform vs Repression

I. Cycles of Democratic Governance and Military Rule

The cycles of democratic governance and military domination that took place during the Cold War involved repeated cycles of interruptions in democratically elected civilian governments, followed by military coups, authoritarian rule, and then a return to civilian governments, which could be unstable in their nature. Such patterns were greatly affected by factors like the weakness of democratic institutions, the lack of stability within the economy, and significant social inequalities that made it difficult for civilian governments to achieve legitimacy, development, and internal peace. Often, military interventions were justified by the need to restore order, eradicate corruption, or even deal with perceived ideological threats.

Other Cold War structures outside of the Containment played a role in shaping these cycles. Through the Containment, the United States was pushed to support regimes that were not communist in nature, such as military-dominated governments. Critical institutions were the Rio Pact, where collective security was established in the Western Hemisphere, and the Organization of American States, which usually followed policies favorable to the United States. Programs of military assistance such as the Alliance for Progress aimed at securing civilian governments by means of economic development; however, such programs often had the effect of fortifying the security structures in countries, which helped to militarize political institutions indirectly.

On the other hand, military training and security cooperation practices during the Cold War era played an equally significant role in the militarization process in question. Organizations such as the School of the Americas gave training to the officers from Latin America on counterinsurgency warfare, and in some cases such training helped in staging coups d'état or establishing dictatorial regimes. On the opposite side of the spectrum, ideological affinity with the USSR often served as a justification for revolutions against existing governments. It should be noted that these military cycles have been supported by underlying issues such as economic dependence, imbalance in land tenure, and ineffective governance structures, which undermined the stability of the civilian government and enhanced the willingness of citizens to accept military authority under emergencies. Even where the military governments attempted to bring about temporary stabilization or economic restructuring, they were oppressive, restrictive, and autocratic.

Eventually, opposition within the country, external pressures, and economic crises would eventually precipitate the return to civilian leadership, though these democratic governments remained unstable and susceptible to military takeover.

II. Human Rights Violations and Political Violence.

Violations of human rights and political violence were very common phenomena during the Cold War in various regions due to the ideological divide, poor governance, and frequent use of military force in subduing political opposition. Governments were known to suspend citizens' freedom, ban elections, and employ the use of security personnel in curbing dissenting views,



while insurgents resorted to guerrilla war tactics and even assassinations against state organs, thus perpetuating cycles of internal strife. Important policy programs like the Containment and the Alliance for Progress by the US government influenced the politics of some regions by promoting anti-communist regimes that included military dictatorships. Besides, the School of the Americas trained security personnel in the art of counter-insurgency that later led to oppressive actions in several countries. Within the USSR region, revolutionary movements received ideological and logistical support. The specific events that occurred in this era, such as the Guatemalan coup d'etat with the backing of American intelligence agencies, the Chilean coup d'etat due to political polarization, and the Nicaraguan civil war with the involvement of Contras with support from the United States, can be used as examples of the connection between human rights violations and the global power game. It should be noted that political violence in this era was exacerbated by economic disparity, poor enforcement of laws, and political exclusion, which facilitated the continuance of state repression and armed insurgency.

III. CASE STUDY: Military Dictatorships in Southern Cone.

Military dictatorships in the Southern Cone during the Cold War are among the most important examples of authoritarian consolidation, political repression, and ideological polarization in South America. The 1973 coup d'état in Chile by General Augusto Pinochet brought an end to the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende, installing a military government that suppressed democracy and introduced censorship in the country. The military junta formed in Argentina after the 1976 coup d'état implemented what is known as the “Dirty War,” in which many oppositionists were detained, tortured, and disappeared. Likewise, military rule in Uruguay from 1973 was characterized by the suspension of democracy and restriction of civil liberties in accordance with the Containment doctrine. These changes were complemented by dynamics occurring in the international Cold War context, where the United States offered different degrees of intelligence assistance, political backing, and training at organizations like the School of the Americas. In terms of regional dynamics, military coordination increased repression within the Southern Cone countries as a whole through Operation Condor, facilitating cross-border monitoring, arresting, and eliminating political dissidents.

It is crucial to realize that these military governments were kept in power because of the combination of factors both internally weak and externally driven by the dynamics of the Cold War. Such issues as economic disparity, weak democratic systems, and political fragmentation created an environment in which military intervention could occur, while the Cold War itself justified dictatorial governments in the name of anti-communist policies.



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11. International and Regional Response

I. Role of the United Nations

The Emergence of UN Peacekeeping during the Cold War

One of the main incentives behind the development of UN peacekeeping was the Cold War political climate in which it evolved. With the end of World War II, some significant changes occurred in the nature of the international system. It evolved from a 'balance of power' structure to a 'bipolar' structure. The transition from a 'balance of power' system to a bipolar system brought about systemic changes in the world order. During the Cold War, the attitude of the two superpowers had a crucial impact on the performance of the UN to maintain peace and security. The superpowers had an interest in bringing to an end proxy wars before they were themselves dragged into direct confrontation. Thus, peacekeeping tended to be limited to preserving an agreed upon truce between opposing national armed forces while alternative mechanisms were used to address a conflict's underlying issues. The UN was excluded from playing any peace operation role within the superpowers' own "spheres of interest," not only in disputes in the western hemisphere, but also in conflicts arising within socialist states. Experience has shown that in order to set up such operations, the UN had to secure not only the consent of the main parties directly concerned, but also the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the super powers. UN peace operations were an important stabilizing factor during the Cold War. The main purpose of setting up peace operations was to keep local conflicts restricted to their limited area so that such conflicts did not escalate in such a way to engulf major superpowers. Localizing the conflict has been an objective in all of the peace operations. The principle of non-involvement in the domestic affairs of states was regarded as sacred, in harmony with the prevailing security conceptualization of the time period under consideration, and this kept the number of peace operations to a minimum. The main characteristics of peace operations during the Cold War era consisted of the following. First, force was to be used only in self-defense. Second, the force used should be proportional. Third, deployment of peace troops required the consent of the parties concerned. Fourth, major powers abstained from providing operations with troops. Fifth, troops carried only light arms. Finally, missions were mainly authorized to oversee armistices and to separate belligerent parties from each other. Peace operations of the Cold War era were free from ideational aspects and cannot be explained by any ideational perspective. They were missions empowered to 'manage' conflicts rather than 'resolve' them. The peace operations undertaken during the Cold War era were conflict-management activities rather than conflict-resolution activities. UN peace operations were an important stabilizing factor during the Cold War. They helped to contain several potentially dangerous conflicts and insulated them from superpower rivalry.



Cold War UN peacekeeping was supposed to prevent overt violence, prevent the global and regional escalation of localized conflicts, and provide the conditions of stability in which peacemaking could occur.

II. Influence of the Organization of American States

The Organization of American States, the oldest regional international organization in the world, traces its origins to the Congress of Panama, convened by Simon Bolivar in 1826 and attended by representatives from Central and South America. That congress drafted the Treaty of Perpetual Union, League and Confederation, signed by the delegates but ratified only by Gran Colombia (today's Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela).

The founding of the OAS coincided with the onset of the Cold War; it reflected the division of the world into spheres of influence and the emergence of a new strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, which would intensify over the years. The OAS became hostage to this bipolarity and the East-West conflict. The asymmetry of power between the United States and the other member states, a structural feature of the organization that persists to this day, was even more pronounced at that time. American leadership helped shape commitments to strategic solidarity and define the inter-American system as incompatible with anti-democratic regimes. Of course, the definition of democracy was shaped by Washington, DC's strategic interests in its global fight against communism, so being democratic was often synonymous with being anti-communist.

The experience of World War II convinced hemispheric governments that unilateral action could not ensure the territorial integrity of the American nations in the event of extra-continental aggression. To meet the challenges of global conflict in the postwar world and to contain conflicts within the hemisphere, they adopted a system of collective security, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) signed in 1947 in Rio de Janeiro.

The OAS Charter was adopted at the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogotá, Colombia on April 30, 1948. The OAS Charter reaffirmed the fundamental rights and duties of states, proclaimed the goals of the new organization, and established its organs and agencies. That conference also approved the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá) and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The OAS Charter proclaimed the organization to be a regional agency within the UN system.

The Cold War was not merely a period during which the OAS was used to organize the U.S. relations with its 'backyard,' a term many Americans use to describe the region, often unaware of the negative connotations it carries elsewhere in the hemisphere. Even trapped in the ideological straitjacket of the fight against communism, the OAS took some steps to structure independent mechanisms, particularly in the area of human rights. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), created in 1959, saw its powers expanded with the adoption of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José), signed in 1969 but took effect a decade later. Despite tentative steps at its inception, the IACHR would become a crucial vehicle for monitoring human rights in all countries of the Americas, including those that did not adhere to the Pact of San José.

The basic objectives of the OAS, as laid out in its Charter, were to strengthen peace and security; promote the effective exercise of representative democracy; ensure the peaceful settlement of disputes among members; provide for common action in the event of aggression; seek solutions to political, juridical, and economic problems that may arise; promote, by cooperative action, economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural development; and limit conventional weapons so as to devote greater resources to economic and social development.



III. Case Study: Organisation of American States (OAS) Actions during Regional Crises


The 1959 Cuban Revolution was seen as an unacceptable threat and a challenge to the division of the world into spheres of influence. It was no surprise that the world came to the brink of nuclear catastrophe in 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Even before the onset of this crisis, Cuba had already had its membership in the Inter-American system suspended by a resolution adopted at a ministerial consultation meeting. The justification applied to Cuba contained a general warning, establishing that any OAS member's adherence to Marxism-Leninism was incompatible with the Inter-American system. A few years later, the OAS was used to legitimize the US intervention in the Dominican Republic, also in the name of saving the country from the clutches of communism. Brazil, already under military rule, happily embarked on this Dominican adventure.



In the 1960s and 1970s, the OAS stood by idly as US interventionism took place in the name of shared hemispheric values, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean, supporting political forces and governments considered allies in the anti-communist struggle, often through invasions or military support. The U.S. also actively supported military regimes in the Southern Cone, maintaining generally cordial and cooperative relations. Although these regimes were authoritarian, their "excesses" were considered lesser evils in the face of the global strategic struggle against communism. Political repression, executions, systematic torture, and the forced disappearance of opponents were overlooked, without provoking embarrassment from those who considered such practices merely collateral damage in the attempt to safeguard democracy and protect Western values.

IV. Bibliography

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12. Past Actions and Precedents

I. Historical Interventions and Treaties

The legal architecture governing intervention in the Western Hemisphere accumulated over decades of treaties, doctrines, pacts, and policies — each layer adding complexity to what the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 had initially established: that the Western Hemisphere was closed to external interference. The Roosevelt Corollary of 1904 transformed that defensive declaration into an affirmative right of US intervention in Latin American affairs, making Washington the self-appointed policeman of hemispheric order. The Good Neighbour Policy of 1933 formally renounced that corollary, and the OAS Charter of 1948 appeared to constitutionalise non-intervention as a binding legal principle across the hemisphere. What the subsequent decades revealed, however, is that treaty commitments and operational practice are not the same thing. The Rio Pact of 1947, signed before the OAS Charter, had already established a collective security framework whose definition of threat was broad enough to accommodate almost any political development a dominant member chose to characterise as dangerous. The Caracas resolution of 1954 extended that logic further, providing a political — if not legally binding — mandate for action against governments designated as communist. By the time the Dominican intervention of 1965 produced the Johnson Doctrine, the gap between the OAS Charter's plain text and US hemispheric practice had become a chasm. The treaty framework remained formally intact; its non-intervention provisions were cited regularly in diplomatic protests by Mexico, Chile, and others. But no enforcement mechanism existed capable of closing the gap between what the treaties said and what the hemisphere's most powerful member did.

II. Cold War Security Policies in Latin America

i) United States Policies

United States security policy in Latin America from 1947 onward operated on a consistent set of assumptions: that any leftist government in the hemisphere represented a potential Soviet foothold; that the removal of such governments, by whatever means necessary, served the collective security interest of the Western Hemisphere; and that the Rio Pact and the OAS provided sufficient multilateral cover to distinguish US-backed intervention from the unilateral aggression those instruments nominally prohibited. These assumptions were institutionalised through a series of concrete programmes. The School of the Americas, established in Panama in 1946, trained Latin American military officers in counterinsurgency doctrine throughout this period. The Office of Public Safety, operating under USAID from 1962, trained police forces across the hemisphere. The Alliance for Progress, launched in 1961, attempted to address the social conditions generating revolutionary politics through economic development — but was consistently subordinated to the security agenda, with aid flowing preferentially to governments that demonstrated anti-communist reliability regardless of their democratic character.



ii) Russian/Soviet Union Policies

The Soviet Union's security policy in Latin America operated differently in method but similarly in logic. Soviet support for Cuba — economic, military, and diplomatic — was the primary instrument of Soviet hemispheric engagement, supplemented by political and ideological support for communist parties across the region. The Soviet Union's extension of military assistance to Cuba following the Bay of Pigs, and the installation of missiles that produced the crisis of October 1962, represented the most direct Soviet security intervention in the hemisphere. Following the Missile Crisis resolution, Soviet policy shifted toward consolidating the Cuban relationship and providing political support to socialist-oriented governments — most notably Allende's Chile — without the direct military engagement that had brought the world to the brink in 1962. As it stands, both superpowers continue to operate security policies in Latin America that treat the sovereignty of the hemisphere's smaller states as subordinate to their own strategic calculations — a reality that the existing treaty framework has proven unable to constrain.





13. Timeline of Key Events

12th March 1947: The Truman Doctrine is declared, marking a shift towards curbing communism and the start of the Cold War

2nd September 1947: The Rio Pact was signed by the USA and 19 other Latin American nations to prevent the spread of communism and handle external threats to the Western Hemisphere.

30th April 1948: The Organization of American States was formally founded through the signing of the OAS Charter in Bogota, Colombia, to establish a formal framework for peace, security, and cooperation among nations in the Western Hemisphere.

4th April 1949: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was ratified

26th July 1953: Fidel Castro leads an attack on the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba. The attack fails and Castro is arrested.

18th June 1954: A military operation was launched to overthrow democratically elected leader Jacobo Árbenz on June 27, 1954. Driven by Cold War fears and the interests of the U.S.-based United Fruit Company, the coup replaced Árbenz with military dictator Carlos Castillo Armas. CIA involvement is suspected in the coup.

1st November 1954: The Eisenhower administration's National Security Council formally defines US policy in Latin America in the NSC Resolution 5432/1. The policy centred on preventing communist governments from taking or holding power — by any necessary means

2nd December 1956: Che Guevara, and 80 rebels land in Oriente Province to launch the guerrilla war against Batista. Near-annihilated within days, the survivors retreat to the Sierra Maestra.

1st January 1959: Fulgencio Batista abandons Cuba on New Year's Day 1959. Rebel forces under Che Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos seize control of Havana.

19th December 1960: Cuba formally cemented its alignment with the Soviet Union, issuing a joint communiqué indicating solidarity with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and embracing Soviet domestic and foreign policies.

3rd January 1961: USA severs diplomatic relations with Cuba

13th March 1961: President Kennedy announces a 10-year, \$20 billion development programme for Latin America — framed as a democratic, capitalist alternative to the Cuban revolutionary model.



17th April 1961: A force of approximately 1,400 CIA-trained Cuban exiles lands at Playa Girón. The Bay of Pigs invasion collapses within 72 hours. Kennedy publicly accepts responsibility — making this the first officially confirmed covert paramilitary operation by the United States against a Latin American state.

Late 1961: Rumours spread about the Kennedy administration launching a major covert programme of sabotage, economic disruption, propaganda, and alleged assassination attempts against Cuba and Fidel Castro.

31st January 1962: At a special meeting of the Organization of American States in Punta del Este, Cuba was expelled from the OAS by a 14–1 vote, with member states declaring Marxism-Leninism incompatible with the inter-American system despite the OAS Charter containing no formal mechanism for expulsion.

22nd October 1962: John F Kennedy announces that the US Navy will intercept all shipments to Cuba.

27th October 1962: A U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba, killing the pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson. Hours later, a Soviet submarine was hit by a depth charge intended as a signal for the ship to surface. The commanders believed that war had begun and prepared to launch a nuclear torpedo. However due to the level-headed actions of Vasili Arkhipov, the strike did not go through.

28th October 1962: Following a covert meeting between Robert Kennedy and Anatoly Dobrynin, it was decided that the USSR would remove its missiles from Cuba if the USA would remove its nuclear arms from Turkey.

31st March 1964: President João Goulart is overthrown by the Brazilian military, initiating an authoritarian dictatorship

28th April 1965: President Johnson sends 22,000 US troops to the Dominican Republic, seemingly to protect American lives but actually to prevent the return of democratically elected President Juan Bosch.

2nd August 1965: The Johnson Doctrine articulates that the United States will not permit the establishment of another communist government in the Western Hemisphere — effectively asserting an unlimited right of unilateral intervention.

9th October 1967: Ernesto "Che" Guevara is captured by Bolivian Army forces and executed without trial in La Higuera, Bolivia. US military advisory presence in Bolivia is confirmed. CIA operational involvement is publicly alleged.



3rd October 1968: General Juan Velasco Alvarado seizes power in Peru, establishing a military government that defies Cold War categorisation — nationalising US corporations, implementing land reform, and pursuing an independent foreign policy.

11th October 1968: Following a military coup in October 1968 that deposed the newly elected President Arnulfo Arias, General Omar Torrijos seized power in Panama and immediately initiated a staunchly nationalist agenda focused on regaining sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone. This heavily contested, US-administered "state-within-a-state" enclave, established under the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, became the epicenter of intense diplomatic tension between Washington and the new regime.

4th September 1970: Salvador Allende elected President of Chile Salvador Allende wins Chile's presidential election, becoming the world's first democratically elected Marxist head of government. The United States' response under President Nixon can be summarized by Henry Kissinger's remarks, "the US sees no reason to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people"

22nd October 1970: General René Schneider, Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army, is assassinated by right-wing Chilean officers attempting to prevent Allende's confirmation. CIA involvement is alleged in Chilean political discourse.

1971-1973: From the moment Allende took office in November 1970, Chile faced a systematic and coordinated withdrawal of international credit and investment. The pattern which spans multilateral development banks, private US corporations, and bilateral trade relations — points strongly to an orchestrated campaign of economic pressure. Its public dimensions are documented, but its direction from Washington is merely alleged.

11th September 1973: The Chilean military bombs the presidential palace. President Allende dies. General Pinochet assumes power and launches systematic repression. US prior knowledge and support are publicly alleged.



14. Questions A Resolution Must Answer

- I. How should the Council address the rise of state-sponsored violence and systematic human rights abuses conducted under the guise of internal anti-communist security?
- II. What mechanisms can be employed by the council to protect a nation's right to implement independent economic or political systems without facing foreign military or economic retaliation?
- III. How can the Security Council effectively monitor and restrict covert operations and intelligence-led political transitions?
- IV. To what extent can historical regional doctrines be reinterpreted to justify modern intervention, and how should the Council regulate such applications of force?
- V. How should the Council respond to the systematic use of state repression and regional intelligence networks designed to eliminate political dissent?
- VI. How can the Security Council address the correlation between extreme land inequality and the rise of ideological extremism without violating a state's domestic jurisdiction?
- VII. What mechanisms can be employed to prevent "preventative containment" strategies from resulting in the systemic overthrow of democratically elected administrations?
- VIII. How can the legitimacy of official diplomatic channels be maintained during times of regional conflict and uncertainty?



15. Guide to Research and Sources

While national newspapers may be acceptable sources of factual information, we recommend that delegates only use globally recognised organisations and their reports for statistical purposes. This is due to the fact that during a prolonged era of an intense conflict and struggles as great as the ones you have to address, statistical information such as death tolls, casualties and even simple facts may be dramatised by certain states due to national bias and jingoistic motives.

While we do not expect you to scrutinise every piece of information that comes your way, *we highly recommend you double check important facts and figures.*

Additionally, here is a list of resources we accept in our committee to aid your research journey:

- Reuters
- Al-Jazeera
- UN organisations or UN affiliated organisations' reports
- Strategic Organisations' Reports such as NATO, The EU, ASEAN and so forth
- Humanitarian Organisations and Political Think Tanks
- Government Statements, Press Releases and Reports

Certain sources which are often a source of contention in MUN include Wikipedia and information gained from unsophisticated sources such as social media, blogs, unofficial journals. While these are *great sources to gain understanding and information for personal use*, please note that statements in the committee made solely on the backing of such sources *will not be acceptable* unless the very same facts are supported by another viable source.

While this background guide acts as your first step to researching, we urge you to not only rely solely on this document and to not use any information directly from this document for your speeches or other involvements in the committee.
